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AIR CARRIERS' LIABILITY: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO
THE MONTREAL AGREEMENTt
By SIR WILLIAM HILDREDtt
T IS A PRIVILEGE and a pleasure for me to visit Dallas and play a
small part in the Symposium on the Warsaw Convention. Apart from
wanting to see Dallas, the persuasive words for me were in Professor Lar-
sen's first letter when he said the Symposium would provide an unbiased
setting for airing-diverse points of view and for allowing the opinions of
foreign scholars and governments to be forcibly and articulately pre-
sented; an opportunity not to be missed.
Millions of words have been uttered and written over the last twenty
months about what is called the Montreal Agreement. At a meeting of
the Air Law Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society last June we had a
lucid speech from Professor Bin Cheng of the Faculty of Law, University
of London. Bearing in mind the key words in the Convention, "for the
unification of certain rules relating to international air transport," he
showed how far we fell short by speaking of five pop singers in the same
aircraft between London and Glasgow who would receive widely differing
amounts of compensation if incapacitated for life, according to whether
the ticket issued was Warsaw pure and simple, or Hague Protocol, or
issued by an airline party to the Montreal Agreement. At my age the
sudden incapacitation of five successful pop singers is something I can
face with equanimity, but I do feel that they should receive, mutatis
mutandis, the same compensation and not widely different amounts. Pro-
fessor Cheng also brought out that absolute liability went beyond the
normal concept of enterprise liability, and had been secured so far as the
Montreal Agreement was concerned by a virtually unilateral amendment
in the manner of a shot-gun wedding.
BEA's solicitor took the view that all passengers should receive their due
with promptitude, with a minimum of formality, and not too much for
the lawyers. He wanted to perpetuate the Montreal Agreement and secure
it for all international passengers by special contract. He added that in
England, passengers were expected to read the conditions printed on their
tickets and could not plead that because the print was small, it therefore
wasn't there. This reference to the Lisi case reminds us that we have not
heard the last of it for it has a bearing on the Montreal Agreement. Words
in a treaty presumably mean what they say. Sometimes, however, words
mean different things to different people. But I go back to the word
"forcible," and it was here that the fourth speaker, Mr. Lee Kreindler,
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sparked off controversy. He had no time for a limit, any limit, of liability.
He promised that no matter how tightly Conventions or tickets were
drawn, he would do anything possible to break any limits of liability.
You need force to break anything and having heard him, I know what
he means.
The Warsaw Convention was created in 1929. It is, therefore, nearly
forty years old, the dangerous age. If it gets through its forties, it will as-
suredly go ahead to a respectable and honourable old age. It is significant
because it is a rare example of the uniformity in international law. It is the
most universal of all international treaties. It has formed the basis for the
national laws on aviation liability in many countries. The United States
joined in 1934. Russia is a member. It is beneficial to carriers, shippers, pas-
sengers and governments alike. Without it, airlines and plaintiffs would be
perpetually involved in difficult conflicts of law. This would be a bonanza
for the lawyers, but it would produce a desperate situation for those who
have to bear the costs, and would assuredly keep claimants out of their
rightful compensation for a very long time. And the claimants need is
greatest just after the event, when so often the breadwinner has gone up
in smoke. Its real significance is its uniformity; its overriding of all sys-
tems of law. It provides a point of reference for drafting uniform docu-
ments for use throughout the world. After twenty years of IATA, I know
the difficulty of securing unanimous agreement amongst one hundred inter-
national carriers. Some stimulus is needed and the Warsaw Convention has
provided it. The resulting uniformity in documentation is worth a great
deal to the carriers and to the travelling and shipping public.
It has over ninety-two participating governments and the loss of the
Convention, or its denunciation by one immensely powerful government,
would be a very bad setback to international air transport which, above
all other systems of transport, depends and grows upon, the existence of
uniformity. To mention my previous Association, it is the IATA passenger
ticket, the IATA waybill and the IATA baggage check which make
possible international travel by air. These simple pieces of paper universally
accepted, carrying passengers, baggage and freight with a minimum of
trouble, lie at the heart of it.
I was at the Hague in 1955 when discussions were going on which led
to the Hague Protocol, and I sensed the grievance and frustration of the
American delegates at the figure which subsequently came out of it. Nor
can it be said that I was surprised or that the airlines were surprised. The
average income of the American today is, I understand, $13,000; and it is
indefensible that an air carrier who kills him should get away with just
over a year's pay (Hague) and less than a year's pay if he is killed on a
Warsaw flight.
However, he is not expected to do so now; the 1966 Agreement secures
an upper limit of $75,000 (to include lawyers' fees) or $58,000 if lawyers'
fees are excluded. If there happen to be any lawyer listening, I hope they
will forgive me if I say that the difference between the two figures comes
as a shock; and no less a shock to realize that the lawyer's fee is a recog-
nized percentage of the amount successfully claimed. I think I am right
in saying that in England such a practice is called champerty and is an
offence against the law. Dodson and Fogg tried it in Pickwick Papers
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and were only temporarily defeated by Mr. Pickwick going to a debtors'
prison rather than pay out to Messrs. Dodson and Fogg.
I must make this point. The higher the limit, the higher the insurance
costs. This does not matter with the large carriers; but there are many
small airlines who resent the fact that their passengers have to pay the
bill for the higher insurance costs which can benefit only a few passengers
of the wealthier nations. The continuing effort to increase the limits is
not based on a desire to protect the average traveller but to aid a very
few who are the ones most likely to have protected themselves with ade-
quate insurance. Not only that-every increase in maximum liability
means a whacking proportion for the trial lawyer. I impute no motives,
but it is the trial lawyers who are in the forefront of the battle for in-
creased or unlimited liability.
As regards the events leading up to the Montreal Agreement of May
1966, I would go back to 1959 when the CAB approved the new Hague
limit and recommended its ratification, adding that the new limit was far
in excess of that usually in force in foreign countries. But the Senate did
not ratify the Hague Protocol when asked to do so by President Eisen-
hower.
In 1961, the new Administration instructed the Inter Agency Group
on International Aviation to review the United States interest in the War-
saw and Hague Systems. That group recommended ratification of the
Hague Protocol but added that United States carriers should be required
to provide $50,000 of automatic accident insurance for all international
passengers ticketed to or from the United States. The group also expressed
the view that it could not be in the interest of the United States to with-
draw from the Warsaw Convention.
In April 1964, the compulsory insurance bill and the recommendation
to ratify Hague were transmitted to Congress. Although, I understand,
the two propositions could not be kept legislatively together, Congress
failed to act on the compulsory insurance bill; and the Administration re-
submitted the package in April 1965.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings in 1965 and the
compulsory insurance legislation was strongly resisted. The Senate Com-
mittee Report upheld the value of Warsaw, recommended ratification of
Hague, but added that if the Compulsory Insurance Bill were not enacted,
the Department of State should take immediate steps to denounce the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
This is where we sat up and took notice. The Department of State pro-
posed a "carrier" solution, suggesting that United States carriers should
commit themselves to assist the United States Government in bringing
about an early diplomatic conference to increase Warsaw limits to $100,-
000; and in the meantime voluntarily waive the Warsaw limits to that
figure (including legal expenses). The State Department alleged justifica-
tion for $100,000 with the astonishing statement that an award should be
"grossed" to provide for the customary attorney fee of 50 percent. Talk
about battening upon corpses.
The United States carriers studied this astonishing proposition and finally
said they could swallow $50,000 provided the principal foreign carriers
did the same. Their reasons for regarding $100,000 as excessive, though
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apparently kind to the passenger, were set forth with clarity and force.
I should have called them incontrovertible. One can try to be kind and
be the opposite.
The CAB's own statistical survey over a fifteen year period gave an
average compensation of $38,000. Mr. Kreindler has applied a Nelsonian
telescope to his eye and said he had never seen that figure. ICAO, about
the same time, estimated that for the world as a whole, the average non-
Warsaw situation death settlement (including the United States) was
$1 5,000. The United States average is therefore two and one-half times the
world average. If two and one-half is taken as the correction factor and
applied to the Hague Protocol figure, one reaches $40,000. And this
$40,000 is $10,000 less than the carriers' offer of $50,000.
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs had discussions with
the Foreign Relations Committee from which emerged the conclusion that
the compulsory insurance was dropped. The United States ratification of
the Hague Protocol was indefinitely tabled and the State Department was
given carte blanche to decide when and whether to give notice of United
States denunciation of Warsaw.
Through September 1965 I was occupied in seeking individual carrier
acceptance of $50,000. So far only the United States carriers had accepted
that figure. During that month at a North Atlantic Conference in Ber-
muda, I sedulously collected confidential opinions on an individual basis
and felt able to issue a worldwide mail vote designed to secure worldwide
carrier agreement at $50,000 for all traffic to and from the United States.
At the same time I asked my friend, Walter Binaghi, President of ICAO,
if he would call an emergency meeting of member states. Before these
actions could mature, the State Department said that our mail vote was
no good and announced that they would file United States denunciation
on 15 November unless a satisfactory interim solution increasing the
limits could be arrived at.
Nevertheless we went on counting the votes as they came in and we
got worldwide agreement at the carrier level to waive the limit to $50,000.
The CAB followed this up by finding the agreement to be contrary to
the public interest. ICAO also went ahead with its plan for a meeting on
1 February 1966, and passed a resolution expressing the hope that no mem-
ber state would denounce Warsaw in the interim.
But the State Department went ahead and filed notice of denunciation
on 15 November 1965. Under Article 29, denunciation takes effect six
months from the date of notice. The ICAO meeting took place as sched-
uled on 1 February and was inconclusive. And on 7 March 1966, the
State Department, out of the blue, said that carriers must accept "absolute
liability" (waiving any legal defenses under Article 20 (1) of the Con-
vention).
Ours not to reason why. Efforts continued to be made. Walter Binaghi
tendered his personal offices to the United States Government in seeking
an interim solution. But we were left with 15 May coming nearer with
no further result, no change of heart.
Finally on 5 April I felt I had a dying cause and could not make things
worse by direct action. I felt I must risk a snub and cabled Thomas Mann
of the State Department asking whether his government would withdraw
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their notice of denunciation if I could secure agreement before 1 May,
of all United States and major foreign air carriers operating to or from
the United States, to raise the liability limit to $75,000, including legal
costs; and in respect to passengers the waiver by the carrier of defenses un-
der Article 20 (1) which the State Department had called for without
warning on 14 March. Mr. Mann replied saying that if I could achieve these
two things, the United States Government would give serious consideration
to withdrawing its notice of 15 November. He added that it would be diffi-
cult at this late hour as the matter had been decided at the highest levels,
but he would make every effort to do so if my efforts were successful.
The agreement would, he said, have to include all United States trunk
international carriers, scheduled and unscheduled; and amongst foreign
carriers, it must include all carriers flying to and from the United States,
plus those carrying substantial United States origin or destination traffic.
Some of these were not IATA members. With them IATA had no
official contact, but I sent out a cable asking all of them to weigh the
consequences of United States denunciation against the price asked for
withdrawing it. Replies began to come in during the succeeding days. All
were affirmative except five United States carriers who could swallow
$75,000 but could not swallow absolute liability. I said, "Let not the
Lord be angry for lack of five." We collected replies up to 15 April at
6:25 p.m. At that moment I retired from the post of Director General
of IATA, but by then there were sufficient replies to indicate that we
could meet the Department's deadline of 15 May. The running was taken
up by my successor, Knut Hammarskjold, who took over at 6:26 p.m.
that evening. He and IATA's General Counsel, Julian Gazdik, went ahead
with the greatest pertinacity and the result was what is known as the
Montreal Agreement. It was not an IATA agreement as several signatories
were not members of IATA. The State Department's insistence on the
carriers they expected to sign gave us cover from the State Department's
readiness, in other circumstances, to subject the American carrier members
of IATA to an anti-trust suit and walk them up Capitol Hill.
The Agreement will figure largely in the discussions of the next few days
and this is not the moment to outline its terms or its weaknesses. Suffice to
say that it did enable the United States Government to withdraw its de-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention and for that we can all be truly
thankful.
I am obsessed with the thought that in these days of rabid nationalism
with new states coming into being every twenty minutes, there is im-
mense virtue in any international agreement, any international body, any
international convention or treaty. These activities bring together, in their
objectives, in their multiracial staffs, in their use of several languages, a
great and beneficial concentration of cooperation. They constitute, in my
opinion, the best hope of enduring worldwide friendship. I long for the
day when all the ethnic groups of the world can like each other and tease
each other.
After twenty years as an international maid-of-all-work, I am strong for
international cooperation in every field of thought and activity. The
Warsaw Convention must not die. It must be given a face lift with a higher
limit of liability and other amendments done by way of special contract.
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